Recent Criminal Cases by unknown
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 31
Issue 1 May-June Article 9
Summer 1940
Recent Criminal Cases
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation




NoRTWSrTEN UNIvERsITY SCHOOL OF LAW
FMMUND G. PABsT, Case Editor
LEONARD SHAPRno Associate Editors
JosEPH NELLEsd
INTOXIcATION IN "MITIGATION" OF MUR-
DER--[Ind.] Defendant was indicted for
murder in the first degree, tried, found
guilty of murder in the second degree, and
sentenced to life imprisonment. The en-
tire defense was based on the theory that
accused was so drunk at the time of the
killing that he could not have conceived
a premeditated design or formed a crim-
inal intent. The court instructed the
jury that voluntary drunkenness could
not justify, excuse, or mitigate the com-
mission of crime, and the fact that the
defendant may have been drunk to any
degree at the time of the killing should
not be taken into consideraion in reach-
ing a verdict. Defendant's contention that
the latter part of the instruction was er-
roneous was upheld on appeal to the Su-
preme Court of Indiana where reversal
with directions for a new trial was or-
dered, one judge dissenting. O'Neil v.
State, 22 N. E. (2d) 825 (Ind. 1939).
At common law the fact of intoxication
had little or no bearing on the question
of the guilt of one accused of murder.
Drunkenness was never allowed to palli-
ate a criminal homicide. Regina v. Fogash,
1 Plan (Eng.) 7 (1816). The view was
expressed by several common law writers
that inebrity served to aggravate the
crime. Coke, Upon Littleton, p. 247
(1631). This latter view, however, has
never attained acceptance by American
courts, and intoxication is not held to
aggravate the killing into a higher crime.
McIntyre v. People, 38 Ill. 514 (1865). A
few isolated cases in the United States
have held that drunkenness is not a fact
to be considered in determining the de-
gree of the crime. Com. v. Hawkins, 3
Gray 463 (Mass. 1855); State v. Brown,
181 Mo. 192, 79 S. W. 111 (1904). The
early English view as stated in Rex. v.
Grindley in 1819 (1 Russell on Crimes,
p. 80) allowed voluntary intoxication to
be set up in mitigation and in succeed-
ing cases the doctrine was firmly estab-
lished that wherever it was necessary to
prove a specific intent before conviction
could be secured evidence of drunken-
ness was held to be properly admissible
to rebut the crime charged. Marshall's
case, 1 Levin (Eng.) 76 (1830); Reg. v.
Moore, 3 C. C. (Eng.) 319 (1852); Reg.
v. Doherty, 16 Col. C. C. (Eng.) 306
(1887). This latter requirement has been
followed by American courts in cases of
similar nature. Hence, according to both
the American and English view, intoxica-
tion is highly relevant in determining the
degree of homicide.
Murder was punishable with death at
common law but obvious differences in
the state of mind of the accused, together
with a change of thought respecting pun-
ishment, led to the enactment in thirty-
eight states of statutes dividing the crime
into two or more degrees depending upon
the specific intent of the slayer. Thus
[72 ]
CRIMINAL CASES
the Indiana Criminal Code (Burns Ind.
Stat. Ann. §10-3401), which seems typical,
divides murder into two degrees and pro-
vides that "whoever, purposely and with
premeditated malice, kills any human be-
ing, is guilty of murder in the first de-
gree." Murder in the second degree is
described as a killing "purposely and ma-
liciously, but without premeditation." Un-
der both sections a specific intent to kill
a person is apparently required. Since
deliberation and premeditation are the
essence of murder in the first degree un-
der the Indiana cases (Booher v. State,
156 Ind. 435, 60 N. E. 155 (1900)), a per-
son accused of such crime must have men-
tal capacity sufficient to think deliberately
and rationally as to the consequences of
his acts. And so the great weight of
authority in states where two degrees of
murder obtain is that intoxication in such
degree that accused is incapable of form-
ing the premeditated design to kill will
generally serve to reduce the murder from
first to second degree but not to man-
slaughter. People v. Price, 207 Cal. 131,
277 Pac. 316 (1929); Garner v. State, 28
Fla. 113, 9 So. 835 (1891); Rucker v. State,
119 Ohio St. 189, 162 N. E. 802 (1928);
Com. v. Walker, 283 Pa. 468, 129 Atl. 453
(1925); and annos., 12 A. L. R. 894, 79 A.
L. R. 906. Some jurisdictions apparently
disregard the element of intoxication and
apply to drunken persons the principals
that would apply to sober individuals.
Fleenor v. Com., 221 Ky. 175, 198 So. 376
(1927); Evers v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep.
318, 20 S. W. 744 (1892).
Among those jurisdictions allowing a
reduction to second degree murder, a few
vary the general rule and permit the in-
toxication in extreme cases to reduce the
homicide to manslaughter, usually under
particular statutory requirements regard-
ing the intent necessary for second degree
murder. State v. Rumble, 81 Kan. 16,
105 Pac. 1 (1909) (use of the word "pur-
posely" in second degree murder statute
held to -imply the existence of an inten-
tion to cause death; hence if defendant
so drunk there could be no intention,
homicide could be reduced to manslaugh-
ter); Perryman v. State, 12 Okla. Cr. 500,
159 Pac. 937 (1916). The instant case,
since it reverses a conviction of second
degree murder, would seem to fall into
the category of states that will under
certain circumstances allow a reduction to
manslaughter. But this clearly seems to be
a minority doctrine. See Garner v. State,
28 Fla. 113, So. 835 (1891); and anno., 8 A.
L. R. 1053.
In states where murder is not divided
into degrees a reduction to manslaughter
is also allowed. People v. Brisbane, 295
Ill. 241, 129 N. E. 185 (1920); Cagle v.
State, 221 Ala. 346, 100 So. 318 (1924).
This seems logical enough since there is
no other method of reducing the degree
of crime. The question arises whether the
mere fact that there is no degree of mur-
der should make it any easier to reduce
the crime to manslaughter. In so far as
most states where degrees of murder ob-
tain do not allow a reduction beyond sec-
ond degree murder it apparently is; but
in those states which do allow a reduc-
tion to manslaughter the test seems to be
the same whether degrees of murder ex-
ist or not. This follows from the fact that
the reduction depends upon the non-
existence of a felonious intent in either
case.
Manslaughter is generally described as
"an unlawful killing done without malice,
express or implied, either in a sudden
quarrel or unintentionally while in the
commission of an unlawful act." State v.
Schaeffer, 96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N. E. 220
(1917). The distinction between inuider
in the second degree and manslaughter is
the element of malice, which is a neces-
sary constituent of the former but is en-
tirely wanting in the latter. State v.
Hartley, 185 Mo. 669, 84 S. W. 910. Con-
sequently, to secure a reduction from
murder to manslaughter it must clearly
appear that the intoxication was so extreme
as to suspend entirely the power of reason
and to render the accused incapable of
any mental action since the essential ele-
ment of murder, "malice aforethought,"
implies some action of the brain prior to
the act which causes death. People v.
Brisbane, 295 Ill. 241, 129 N. E. 185
(1920) People v. Cochran, 313 Ill. 508,
145 N. E. 207 (1925). To secure the re-
duction to manslaughter the intoxication
must be so complete as to render impos-
sible all ability to reason or to form any
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intent and where the defendant himself
testifies to his acts, thoughts, and inten-
tions at the time of the killing, murder
in the first degree is sustainable despite
drunkenness. People v. Anderson, 337
Ill. 310, 169 N. E. 243 (1929); Cogle v.
State, 211 Ala. 346, 100 So. 318 (1924);
Choate v. State, 19 Okla. Cr. Rep. 169,
197 Pac. 1070 (1921). Consistent with
this analysis is a recent Alabama holding-
(Ivory v. State, 237 Ala. 344, 186 So. 460
(1939)) to the effect that a reduction of
the killing to manslaughter is only proper
in a situation where the accused is so
drunk that rational action is impossible,
thereby negativing the possibility of spe-
cific intent or a reduction of the homicide
to murder in the second degree where the
drunkenness refutes the essential of pre-
meditation and deliberation. In a situa-
tion where the killing is with adequate
provocation, drunkenness may go to show
that the act was committed under the
influence of sudden passion, caused by the
provocation, and not from a precedent
malice, thereby reducing the crime to
manslaughter. Williams v. State, 81 Ala.
1, 1 So. 179 (1886); Buchannan v. Com.,
86 Ky. 110 (1887); Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Beard (1920), A. C. 479.
Of course, intoxication at most will re-
duce the crime to manslaughter an i never
can work an acquittal unless it is so ex-
treme that actual insanity has resulted.
Beasley v. State, 50 Ala. 149; Anno., 12
A. L. R. 897. Also, it is important to note
that where the homicidal intent was
formed before the intoxication, murder in
the first degree is clearly sustainable; in-
toxication is here viewed as serving only
to nerve or brace the already formulated
intent. State v. Hammonds, 216 N. C. 67,
3 S. E. (2d) 439 (1939); Bishop v. United
States, 107 F. (2d) 297 (1939). On the
other hand, a complete defense is permit-
ted where the situation involves one who
is involuntarily intoxicated or who has
been drugged against his will. Bartholo-
mew v. People, 104 Ill. 601 (1882).
The decision on the vital question of
the extent of the defendant's intoxication
at the time of the offense is left to the
jury, under proper instructions, permit-
ting it thereby to set the measure of the
crime. People v. Burkhart, 211 Gal. 726,
297 Pac. 11 (1931). Almost all courts in-
struct the jury that intoxication is not to
be considered for the purpose of excus-
ing or mitigating the killing but only for
the purpose of determining whether the
defendant was capable of entertaining the
necessary purpose, malice, or intent which
is an indispensable ingredient of the crime
charged. But such talk is mere sophistry;
how intoxication may be a circumstance
to be considered by the jury in deter-
mining intent and yet not be an excuse
for the crime is a distinction for lawyers,
not lay jurors, to draw. See Evers v.
State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 318, 20 S. W.
744 (1892). Obviously the distinction is
designed to disguise the odious position
of allowing a citizen already violating
public morals by being drunk to escape
the same offense with a lighter punish-
ment than a sober person. Such highly
legalistic reasoning, as is often the case,
leads to confusion and was the cause of
the erroneous instruction in the instant
case. If, as the Supreme court held, the
first part of the instruction that drunken-
ness can not excuse, justify, or mitigate
the commission of crime was correct, it
can easily be understood why the trial
judge went on to say that intoxication
cannot be taken into consideration at all
in determining guilt. For if drunkenness
is taken into consideration at all it is dif-
ficult to understand how it can act any-
way other than in mitigation. It would
seem more sensible if the courts would
face the facts and, rather than say intoxi-
cation can not be considered in one part
of an instruction and yet hold it can not
be ignored in another part, instruct that
drunkenness may mitigate murder-but
only if it is so severe that the defendant
is rendered incapable of forming the nec-
essary felonious intent.
EXTORTIoN-THE SPEED-TRAP [III.]-
The recent case of People v. Braun, 24
N. E. (2) 879 (III. App., 1940) is one
which may have far-reaching repercus-
sions. It has the added distinction of be-
ing the first case of its kind, if not in the
United States, at least in Illinois.
The defendants in the principal case
were police officers, a police magistrate,
and the president of the village of Dix-
iioor. They were charged with conspir-
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ing to extort money from motorists, in
maintaining a "speed trap," arresting mo-
torists on the slightest infraction of traffic
rules, and sometimes on doubtful viola-
tions thereof. These motorists were
brought before Braun, the magistrate,
who would threaten to impose large fines;
and when they were convinced of the
futility of refusing to pay, he would im-
pose smaller fines, which they were only
too glad to pay. The motorists all pleaded
guilty, evidently realizing it was useless
to do otherwise. Under Ill. Rev. Stats.
(1937), C. 53, §59, the magistrate should
have assessed maximum costs of $2; but,
as the evidence showed, many were fined
above the statutory rate. To further sub-
stantiate the illegal purpose, it was shown
that these officials received their com-
pensation from this fund so collected-
which proved no small amount. The de-
fendants were all found guilty, and sen-
tenced to imprisonment of 1 year plus
fines ranging from $500 to $1,000. On ap-
peal, this conviction was affirmed in the
case reported.
The unusual feature of this case is that
the authorities-all public officials-were
brought to trial on a criminal charge, and
the fines imposed were not merely re-
versed as denials of "due process." Most,
if not all, of these cases where there is a
trial before an official who is financially
interested in the conviction of defendants,
have arisen as denials of due process.
The leading case of this nature is Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927). There, the
mayor of an Ohio town was trying liquor
violation cases under a State statute,
which allowed to the community adjudg-
ing such cases one-half of the fines levied.
By a city ordinance, he and the officers
were to be paid out of the fund collected.
Tumey, the defendant, objected to a trial
before the mayor, claiming denial of due
process. The Supreme court upheld this
contention, saying that the mayor had a
direct, pecuniary interest in convicting
defendant, viz., in the costs imposed, and
a system by which an inferior judge is
paid for his services only on convictions
is not due process unless the costs are so
small that they come within the de mini-
mis rule. Though following this decision,
Williams v. Brannen, W. Va. 1, 178 S. E.
67 (1935), strikes nearer the core. There,
the court in a very discerning opinion ex-
presses the pungent observation that it is
ordinarily cheaper to pay a moderate fine
than to pay the expenses necessary for an
appeal; wherefore, many an innocent man
has submitted to an unjust decision in an
inferior court. The Constitution requires
a fair and impartial tribunal in the first
instance, where the defendant won't face
the alternative of paying an unjust fine or
resorting to the delay of appeal. Most
of the cases reiterate these principles, and
those holding contra can be distinguished
either on the ground that no direct, pe-
cuniary interest was shown, or that no
objection to the interest of the judge was
made at the appropriate time, and was
therefore deemed to have been waived.
On this point, Illinois has held that the
purpose of the due process clause in the
Ill. Constitution, Art. 2, Sec. 2 of Smith-
Hurd, is to protect every citizen in his
personal and property rights against arbi-
trary action of any person or authority,
356 Ill. 230, 190 N. E. 273 (1934), and of
public officials, People v. Belcantro, 356
II. 144, 190 N. E. 301 (1934); it is not
necessarily confined to judicial proceed-
ings in court, 233 Ill. 417, 84 N. E. 376
(1908), the court said that due process
means the due course of legal proceedings
according to those rules and forms which
have been established for the protection
of private rights, one of the foremost of
which is an impartial tribunal for the ad-
judication of such rights. In so holding,
the court held unconstitutional a statute
giving the court power to direct one of
the commissioners of a drainage district
to act with the others in assessing bene-
fits, when the first commissioner owned
lands which might be subject to the as-
sessment. So there seems little doubt that
the actions of the officials of Dixmoor, in
this instance, were a violation of due
process. But-and this is the significant
point-violation of due process is not a
punishable offense; at most it is merely
grounds for reversal, for it is a protec-
tion which is, in many instances, inde-
finable until a situation arises in which
the court believes the facts show such a
palpable denial of a fair and just proceed-
ing as to warrant a reversal. Therefore,
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if these officials were to be punished
criminally, it was necessary to employ
some other machinery, namely, an appro-
priate criminal action, which proved to be
the crime of conspiracy to extort money.
Under the common law extortion was
limited to the obtaining of money or
other things of value through misuse of
official power; but by statute (Ill. Rev.
Stats. (1937), C. 38, §240) the crime is
widened so as to include anyone. Gen-
erally, any person clothed with official
privileges and duties may commit. extor-
tion, and this includes justices, sheriffs,
etc. The gist of the offense by a public
official is the taking under color of his
office; and the person paying such money
must have yielded to such authority.
Moreover, an extortion is committed by
an officer who wilfully demands or re-
ceives fines not allowed or greater than
allowed, by law; and the taking must
be wilful and corrupt. 20 American Jur-
isprudence, Extortion and Blackmail.
In the instant case, the taking of illegal
costs-that is, fees higher than allowed by
Ill. Rev. Stats. (1937) C. 53, §59--consti-
tuted an extortion, as the court found.
Though the state might have brought its
action under Section 240, they undoubt-
edly felt that the punishment thereunder
was not so severe as under the conspir-
acy section, and wisely chose the latter,
where the imprisonment and fine pro-
vided for is twice that of the former sec-
tion.
The essence of conspiracy is not the ac-
complishment of an unlawful purpose,
but it is the unlawful combination or
agreement to accomplish the unlawful
purpose, and the conspiracy is complete
when the agreement is made. People v.
Drury, 338 Ill. 539, 551, 167 N. E. 523)
(1929); People v. Cohn, 358 Ill. 326, 193
N. E. 180 (1934). At common law every
conspiracy to do an unlawful act, or to do
a lawful act for an illegal, fraudulent,
malicious, or corrupt purpose, or for a
purpose which has a tendency to preju-
dice the public in general, was an in-
dictable offense, People v. Amore, 369
Ill. 245, 16 N. E. (2d) 720 (1938). In
Smith v. People, 251 Ill. 9 (1860), the
court held that conspiracies to accomplish
purposes which are not by law punishable
as crimes, but which are unlawful as vio-
lative of the rights of individuals, and for
which the civil law will afford a remedy
to the injured party, and will at the same
time and by the same process punish the
offender for the wrong done to society
by giving exemplary damages beyond the
damages actually proved, have been sus-
tained as indictable offenses. The law
doesn't punish criminally every act, un-
lawful though it is, though the offense
may be a grievous one to society. It is
the influence of the act or purpose on
society, however, which determines
whether a combination to accomplish it is
a criminal conspiracy. From this case
we may conclude that, in Illinois it is
possible to indict for a conspiracy to do an
unlawful act when the unlawful act is not
made so by a criminal statute but where
such act, if completed, would be the sub-
ject of a civil suit for compensatory and
punitive damages. This was also true
common law, where it was not necessary
that the object to be accomplished by the
combination be a crime to make the con-
spiracy an indictable offense, 11 American
Jurisprudence, sec. 11. The common law
is still in force and effect in Illinois (Ch,
28, Smith-Hurd), and this indictment,
though it comes under ch. 38, sec. 138,
still states a common law offense. Thus
it is evident that the facts of the principal
case show there could be no error in
bringing this indictment on a charge of
conspiracy, either for doing an unlawful
act or for doing a lawful act for an illegal
purpose; the unlawful act being the impo-
sition of fees beyond the statutory limit;
the illegal purpose, that of furthering their
own pecuniary interests by arresting these
motorists and fining them accordingly
without due process of law.
From the standpoint of public policy,
this decision is unimpeachable. The
dangers of such practices as have been
set out in the instant case are not so
remote as to be disregarded; in fact, they
are quite imminent. This same condition,
namely, that of "speed traps," is quite
prevalent, and in the last decade has
emerged from the fledgling stage to that
of thriving self-subsistence, fostered by
the stolid refusal of motorists who are
either too respectful of any authority or
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are too lethargic to contest such actions
by "overzealous" public officials. The
general attitude seems to be that these
officials are acting within the scope of
their power; and, even if they are not, of
what use would it be to refuse to pay?
The possibility of a jail sentence and of
the costly and slow processes of appeal
are certainly not worth a refusal to pay a
relatively small fine. Since these are un-
doubtedly the conditions prevailing, the
realistic approach is to do something for
these innocents, who are unaware of the
extent of their rights or the limits of the
official powers. The State, in assuming
the burden of stamping out such practices,
has taken the only really effective way to
safeguard the Constitutional principles of
personal and property rights, and justice
to be dispensed by the doctrine of due
process of law. It is hoped that the Illi-
nois Supreme court, if called on to decide
this question, will affirm this unprece-
dented, but highly desirable view taken
by these lower courts.
SELwYN COLEMAN
NEcEssrTY OF A PRECAUTIONARY WARNING
BY POLICE OFFICER TO VALIDATE A CONFES-
siox-The case of [Iowa] State v. Mikesh,
288 N. W. 606, (Iowa, 1940), in which the
Iowa court held that the precautionary
warning "whatever you say may be used
against you" is not necessary to make ad-
missible a criminal confession made to a
police officer by the defendant while in
custody before trial, raises the question
which has caused a great deal of mis-
understanding among police officers and
prosecutors today. The question is whether
in the absence of a statute the inquisitorial
precautionary warning is a constitutional
or judicial requirement in the personal
investigation of persons suspected of a
crime. If the warning is omitted, will the
courts consider an admission of guilt or a
confession as invalid? The answer to the
foregoing question is no.
Nevertheless most law enforcement
agencies have used this warning state-
ment before all personal investigations
are commenced, laboring under the mis-
taken notion that it was an absolute neces-
sity required by the Constitution, or dog-
matically insisted upon by the courts, and
if the warning was omitted, the accused
could invalidate the complete testimonial
by simply showing that he was not warned
that whatever he would say would be
used against him. Perhaps this notion is
an outgrowth of the observance of the
privilege against self incrimination being
exercised during the trial in the court.
However, the privilege against self in-
crimination applies only to judicial con-
fessions (those made before a court and
part of the pleading) and is in no way
connected with extra-judicial confessions
(those made under preliminary police in-
vestigation before the trial). 2 Wharton,
Criminal Evidence, (11th Ed., 1935) §627;
20 Amer. Jur. §505.
The origin of the extra-judicial precau-
tionary warning can be traced back to
the early common-law days of England.
Under the common law a person was not
allowed to testify as a witness, though his
confessions or incriminating statements,
if voluntarily made, could be used as evi-
dence against him. As a result of the
absolute effect of these admissions in the
courts, the kings officers quite commonly
tortured a confession from the defendant
while he was confined in prison. Realiz-
ing the harsh injustice of this practice,
the common law courts developed rules
of evidence requiring the prosecutors to
show that the confession they were in-
troducing was made voluntarily and free
from torture and intimidation. It was in
such a situation that the precautionary
warning seems to have had its birth. See
20 Amer. Jur. §482. The practice of the
warning seems to have survived ever
since and probably found its way to the
American Colonies with other common
law doctrines.
Until late in the last century, the privi-
lege of the accused not to testify against
himself was coupled with a corresponding
disability to be unable to testify in his
own behalf. Until 1878, the accused was
an incompetent witness in the Federal
courts. The legislature, removing his dis-
ability, said, "the person.., charged shall,
at his own request, but not otherwise, be
a competent witness." 20 Stat. 30 (1878);
28 U. S. C. 632 (1934). Even with this
improvement in criminal procedure the
common-law precautionary warning, still
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lingered. As the Wyoming court has ob-
served, "The rules surrounding such con-
fessions or admissions that developed
under the common law have been ex-
tended and applied in cases where the
common law disability has been removed
by statute." See Maki v. State, 18 Wyo.
481, 112 P. 334, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 465
(1911).
While the extra-judicial precautionary
warning undoubtedly had been a valuable
safeguard for the accused in the common-
law days, its benefit in protecting the
rights of the modern criminal has dwin-
dled to the point where its detriments far
outweigh the now slight and questionable
protection it affords. The great advance-
ment and humanitarian approach in the
field of criminal investigation, the con-
stitutional safeguards, the right of the
accused to testify in his own behalf, and
his right to a civil action against the of-
ficers who might torture him, constitute
a few of the more obvious reasons for the
change. Perhaps the greatest practical
objection to giving the warning is that it
transforms a suspect, who might willingly
relate the facts to the police as he saw-
them, into an unimpeachable "clam"
whose stubbornness as a source of con-
structive information is exceeded only by
his flat refusal to "talk" until he has seen
a lawyer; and after that, the police will
never have the story as the accused might
have told it if the precautionary warning
had not been interposed. In most cases
it distorts what would be a truthful con-
fession, needlessly interferes with the
investigation of detectives and prosecu-
tors, and generally obstructs the prompt
solution of many crimes. Yet, ironically,
the very investigators and prosecutors it
hinders cause their own inconvenience
through their mistaken belief that the
warning is necessary. There is no Ameri-
can court that absolutely requires a warn-
ing to be given, and, at most, there are
only a small minority of jurisdictions that
recognize it as evidence of the voluntary
nature of the cod.-fession where there is a
statute or constilutional provision or an
iron-clad common law doctrine which
requires that all prosecutors have the
burden of proving that the confession of
the accused was voluntary. Most of the
recognized legal writers observe that "a
confession is admissible although it does
not appear that the prisoner was warned
that whatever he said might be used
against him, or although it appears that
he was not so warned." Cf. Joy, Confes-
sions, §5, p. 45; 2 Wharton, Criminal Evi-
dence (11th Ed. 1935) §627. This unequiv-
ocably means that the warning is not
necessary to make the confession valid
in the eyes of the court.
Under the Fifth Amendment which was
enacted shortly after the adoption of the
United States Constitution, one might ex-
pect the terms against self-incrimination,
declaratory of the American Revolution-
ary sentiment against English common
law practices, to require such warning as
a precedent to criminal investigations.
But the United States Supreme Court has
held, in effect, that simply because the
confession is made to a police officer
while the accused is under arrest, in or
out of prison, or was drawn out by his
question, does not necessarily render the
confession involuntary and therefore in-
valid; but, at most, such imprisonment or
interrogatories made without warning
may be taken into account in determining
whether or not the statements of the pris-
oner were involuntary. See Sparf and
Hansen v. United States, 156 U. S. 51
(1894). The case of Brain v. United States,
168 U. S. 532 (1897), requires the prosecu-
tion to show that the confession of guilt or
any other incriminating statement was
freely and voluntarily rendered by the ac-
cused before the court will receive it as
evidence against him. Thus, the "federal"
rule, the strictest of three general opinions
on this subject, does not require that the
precautionary warning be given, but only
demands that the confession be voluntary.
Cf. Com. v. Szczepanek, 235 Mass. 411,
126 N. E. 847 (1920); Com. v. Dilsworth,
289 Pa. 498, 137 Atl. 683 (1927); and others
in Underhill, Criminal Evidence (4th ed.
1935) §267. The giving of a warning may
be evidence that such confession was
voluntary. While this means that the bur-
den of proving the voluntary character
lies on the prosecutor, it does not neces-
sarily mean that the warning must be
used, as there are other means of show-
ing that the confession was voluntary
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without sacrificing the advantages of a
confession free from the fear that exists
in a person accused of crime when he is
cautioned that whatever he says may be
used against him.
The great majority of American juris-
dictions have no statute on the question
and most of them follow the rule as illus-
trated by the instant case, and as set out
in 16 Cor. Jur. §1482, p. 723 . . . "In
absence of a statute requiring caution or
a warning, the fact that a voluntary con-
fession was made without the accused
having been cautioned or warned that it
might be used against him does not affect
its admissibility." These courts, not being
bound by the English common law tra-
ditions as closely as the Federal and New
England jurisdictions, refuse to follow the
rule requiring the prosecution to estab-
lish a presumption of the voluntary nature
of any incriminating confession. See
Roberts v. State, 2 Boyce (Dela) 385, 79
AtI. 396 (1911); State v. Baker, 58 S. C.
111, 36 S. E. 501 (1900); Simon v. State,
36 Miss. 636, (1857). These tribunals have
moulded their rules of evidence so as to
require the defendant to show that the
confession, which appears valid on its
face, is incompetent. In other words, the
burden of proving invalidity is not on the
prosecutor, 'as under the "federal" rule,
but on the defendant. The Illinois court
seems to accept the majority view in the
case of Fahner v. People, 330 Ill. 516, 162
N. E. 133 (1928), where it was said, "The
fact that the evidence does not show that
the defendant was warned against his in-
terest that what he would say might be
used against him, does not render the
statement incompetent, where, so far as
the record shows, no promises or threats
were made; . . .". Therefore, in most
jurisdictions, there is no reason at all for
giving the warning as long as the testi-
monial appears valid on its face.
We may categorize a third class of juris-
dictions as those states which follow the
majority rule but in dictum suggest that
the better course for an officer to pursue,
when a prisoner is about to make a state-
ment, is to warn him that it may be used
against him. In the case of People v.
Randazzio, 194 N. Y. 147, 87 N. E. 112,
(1909) the court said, "Some criticism
has been made of the district attorney in
taking the confession of the defendant
without warning him." Here the state-
ment of the defendant had just been made
to a third person, and the subsequent
statement made to the district attorney
for the purpose of having it taken down
verbatum by a stenographer. The court
went on, "It may be that we should have
been better satisfied with the action of the
district attorney had he given such a
warning, but his failure to do so does not
furnish ground for reversal of this case."
See also Greenwood v. State, 107 Ark. 568,
156 S. W. 427, (1913) and Reagan v.
People, 49 Colo. 316, 112 P. 785 (1911).
Decided 1910.
In Chicago many of the law enforce-
ment agencies have made a practice of
questioning the suspect orally to obtain the
needed information; then, before calling in
a stenographer to have the testimony
written down, warn the accused that his
statements may be used against him. They
next proceed to re-question him for the
purpose of record and the suspect is
bound by his former statements. Other
branches of the police make use of printed
forms on which the confession is written
down and when the accused signs the form
he also affixes his name to a clause on the
paper which admits that the accused was
duly warned of the importance of his
statements. These investigation agencies
believe they are fulfilling a requirement
of the court when, as a matter of judicial
fact, there seems to be no such require-
ment in Illinois. In addition, they are
extending absolutely no protection, what
little there still remains, by "warning" the
prisoner in such a manner. If this prac-
tise is being followed on a nation-wide
scale, the extra-judicial precautionary
warning, which is not necessary in the
eyes of the American courts, and which
serves no practical benefit because it is
not a warning if given after the accused's
real confession, is useless.
In conclusion, we have seen that al-
-though theoretically, the warning today
has little benefit when measured with the
obstacles it throws into the paths of jus-
tice, practically, the insignificant benefit
which could be derived, is nullified by the
inquisitorial practises in Chicago and
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other large American cities. When one
eliminates its practical necessity, the only
thing left is the theoretical necessity out
of which its practical necessity arose,
namely that the courts might require the
warning before they recognize the con-
fession as valid. But we have seen that
the courts do not require it, and a mere
minority say that they will recognize it
only as evidence of the voluntary nature
of a confession. It can readily be seen
that the extra-judicial precautionary
warning is really only a vestigial appen-
dix and must soon take its place with
other common-law antiques which have
lost their practical value in the enforce-
ment of American jurisprudence.
WILLIAm R. STEAD
JOSEPH R. SCHWABA
JURISDICTION OF LARCENY AND ROBBERY
AS AFFECTING TE RIGHT OF A SPEEDY TRIAL
(ILL.)-The defendant was convicted of
robbery in the circuit court of Lake County,
Illinois. On February 8, 1937, before the
case was called for trial, defendant filed a
motion for discharge alleging that he had
been arrested in Chicago on August 20,
1936 and continuously kept in custody for
more than four months contrary to Ill.
Rev. Stats. (1939) C. 38 §748. Defendant
was a participant in a hold-up in Lake
County, and was apprehended in Cook
County with the stolen goods in his pos-
session. He was indicted in Cook County
for larceny of a motor truck, larceny of
its contents, and receiving the truck as
stolen property. On November 18th the
indictment was stricken with leave to re-
instate and the defendant released from
custody. Immediately afterwards, the
sheriff of Lake County, Illinois, arrested
the defendant and returned him to that
county, where he was held from Novem-
ber 18th, 1936 to February 8th, 1937. On
these facts the Supreme Court held that
the accused was not denied a "speedy
trial" within the constitutional requisite
even though he had not been brought to
trial within four months of his commit-
ment in Cook County jail, since the Cook
County court lacked jurisdiction to convict
him of the charge of robbery. People v.
Stillwagon, 373 I1. 211, 25 N. E. (2d)
(1940).
Both at common law and by express
provision of Ill. Rev. Stats. (1939) C. 38
§707 "Where property is stolen ... in one
county of this state and carried into
another, the jurisdiction shall be in any
county into or through which the prop-
erty may be passed, or where the same
may be found," and the accused may be
prosecuted for larceny in either county.
Under such circumstances the transporting
of the goods into another county is re-
garded as a continuation of the original
trespass, so that there is in that county
a taking, an asportation, and a felonious
intent. The defendant could have been
tried in Cook County for larceny, since
he had brought the stolen goods into that
county. People v. Brickey, 346 Ill. 273,
178 N. E. 483 (1931); Campbell v. People,
109 Ill. 565, 50 A. R. 621, (1884); People v.
Flynn, 302 Ill. 549, 135 N. E. 101, (1922);
People v. McGovern, 307 Ill. 373, 138 N. E.
632 (1923).
Larceny and robbery are distinct of-
fenses, in that, in the latter, the taking is
by physical force and without the consent
of the owner. (Ill. Rev. Stats. (1937) C.
38 §501). Under Ill. Rev. Stats (1939) C.
38 §703, as at common law, the local juris-
diction of all offenses not otherwise pro-
vided for by law, is in a county where
the offense was committeed. Since a
robbery is completed when the property
has come into the actual possession of the
robber, the offense is committed in the
county where such possession is obtained,
and the robber can only be prosecuted
there. Watt v. People, 126 Ill. 9, 18 N. E.
340, 1 L. R. A. 403 (1888); Johnson v.
People, 66 IM. App. 103 (1895). A person
who commits robbery in one county and
carries the stolen property into another
county is not guilty of robbery in the lat-
ter county, but of larceny only. People v.
Brickey, supra; Campbell v. People, supra.
Therefore Cook County never had juris-
diction to try this defendant for robbery.
The historical basis for the provisions
of Ill. Rev. Stats. (1939) C. 38 §748 is the
so-called English Habeas Corpus Act (31
Car. 2 c. 2) by the provisions of which a
person committed for treason or felony
must be indicted by the next term of court
or else discharged. A time is usually set
within which the accused person must be
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indicted or tried, and the time prescribed
in the statutes is that during which de-
fendant was held by the sheriff of the
court to which application for discharge
was made. The requirements of the
Habeas Corpus Act cannot be evaded by
discharging the prisoner and at once re-
arresting him on another indictment for
the same charge, (Crosby's cases, 12 Mod.
66), though on his discharge, he may
be re-arrested and held on an indictment
for a substantially different cause. Brown
v. State, 85 Ga. 713, 11 S. E. 831 (1889).
See. 748, supra, provides that "Any per-
son committed for a criminal . . .offense
and not admitted to bail, and not tried
by the court having jurisdiction of the of-
fense within four months of the date of
commitment, shall be set at liberty by the
court unless the delay shall happen on
the application of the prisoner, or unless
the court is satisfied that due exertion has
been made to procure the evidence on the
part of the People and that there is rea-
sonable ground to believe that such evi-
dence may be procured at a later day, in
which case the court may' continue the
cause for not more than sixty- days.
The Illinois Supreme Court has repeat-
edly held that this statute which gives
effect to the constitutional provision
guaranteeing the right to a speedy trial,
(Art. II, §9, Ill. Const. 1872) is mandatory,
and cannot be nullified by technical eva-.
sions.
The following cases illustrate the car-
dinal principal that the statute (Sec. 748,
supra), cannot be technically evaded by
methods described below. To understand
the principle of "evasion" in its relation
to the instant case, it will be necessary
to review briefly some leading Illinois
cases which interpret Art. H, Sec. 9 and
Sec. 748 supra. (People v. Schmagien,
361 Ill. 371, 198 N. E. 142, (1935); Guth-
mann v. People, 203 Ill. 260, 67 N. E. 821
(1903).
In People v. Emblem, 362 Ill. 142, 199
N. E. 281 (1936) it was held in reversing
defendant's conviction, that although he
voluntarily accompanied police officers to
Chicago for the purpose of testifying in
another case, and was confined without
formal commitment for over four months,
he was protected by this statute. In
Newlin v. People, 221 Ill. 166, 77 N. E.
529 (1906) the first indictment against the
defendant was nolle prossed and a second
indictment returned alleging the same of-
fense as the first. The court held that the
defendant even though tried within four
months after the return of the second in-
dictment was entitled to liberty. In
People v. Jonas, 234 Ill. 56, 84 N. E. 685
(1908) it was held that a prisoner held
under a void sentence by a court having
no jurisdiction of the offense for which
he was tried and convicted must be re-
garded as being held for trial in the
proper court.
To give effect to the constitutional in-
tent, the period fixed must date from the
arrest and not from the time the indict-
ment is returned. People v. Szobar, 360
Ill. 233, 195 N. E. 233 (1935); People v.
Franzone, 359 Ill. 391, 194 N. E. 567 (1935);
People v. Wilson, 356 Ill. 256, 190 N. E.
270 (1934); Guthmann v. People, supra;
People v. Heider, 225 Ill. 347, 80 N. E. 291
(1907); People v. Lindner, 262 Ill. 223, 104
N. E. 329 (1914).
In People v. Emblem, supra, the Su-
preme Court of Illinois stated "the de-
fendant was as effectively and completely
restrained of his liberty during such
interim as though he had been committed
by the judicial order of some magistrate
or court of record having jurisdiction of
the subject-matter in issue and of the
person of the defendant. Officers may not
thwart the provisions of the statute by
arresting without warrant and incarcerat-
ing a prisoner without an order of com-
mitment of some court of competent
jurisdiction."
In Guthmann v. People, supra, the court
quotes from Gillespie v. People, 176 Ill.
238, 52 N. E. 250 (1898) where in discussing
the right to a discharge under this statute,
it was said: "The intent of the statute is
that the right to discharge shall result
from a want of prosecution." In discussing
the Guthmann case the Supreme Court in
People v. Kidd, 357 Ill. 133, 191 N. E. 245
(1934) said: "The decision in that case is
based upon the doctrine that the evil in-
tended to be prevented was wrongful
incarceration rather than wrongful accu-
sation. The right to a speedy trial means
the right to have speedily heard the charge
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upon which the accused is detained and
that this constitutional provision is based
on the right of an individual to be at
liberty."
Wharton, Criminal Evidence (11th ed.
1935) §850 states, "Where a crime is partly
consummated in each of several jurisdic-
tions, so that the courts each have juris-
diction of the offense, a prosecution can-
not be instituted in one jurisdiction, then
dismissed at the pleasure of the prosecu-
tion, and commenced in another, and so
harass the accused in every place. in
which prosecution can be obtained.
(Diblee v. Davison, 25 Ill. 403 (1861)."
In the instant case the defendant was ap-
prehended in Cook County, kept in the
Cook County jail almost three months,
and then released to the Lake County
sheriff within the confines of the Cook
County jail. Defendant was never ac-
cused of more than one offense. The of-
fense was alleged to be either larceny or
robbery or receiving stolen property, but
it was not charged that he was guilty of
more than one of them. Under this ruling
a person accused of robbery can be-con-
fined in the jail of each county through
which he has carried the goods for almost
four months and finally taken to the
county in which the robbery has taken
place and again have the statutory four
month period begin. This holding appears
to be a technical evasion, and it would be
better in these cases to have the period be-
gin when the accused is first arrested, so
that the prosecutor of the county where the
robbery has taken place would be forced to
ask for an extension of time as provided in
the statute before the four month period
has terminated.
FRANK A. EDEsiA.
